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INTRODUCTION
Millions of lives are saved each year thanks to the production
and distribution of increasingly innovative pharmaceuticals. These
technological advances are not created without cost, however; the
pharmaceutical industry is one of the most heavily regulated and
must expend substantial time and money researching and
developing products that will be safe and effective for public
consumption.1 As a result, the pharmaceutical industry relies more
than any other on the patent system as a means of ensuring returns
for its substantial investments.2 While pharmaceutical companies
1

See Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug
Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 420, 420 (2006); Joseph A.
DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J.
HEALTH ECON. 151, 151 (2003).
2
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’ Y L.
& ETHICS 717, 721 (2005); Adam Lewin, Medical Device Innovation in America:
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are incentivized to innovate through market exclusivity in patent
protection, the enormous public benefits they provide demand
effective and meaningful protection for the innovators in this
industry.
However, the pharmaceutical industry faces many obstacles:
the United States is suffering one of the largest drug shortages in
history; research and development costs for pharmaceutical
companies are rising; the number of new drugs entering the market
is declining; and pharmaceutical innovation is stifled.3 Many of
these setbacks appear directly linked to the difficulties drug
companies face when entering a new product into the market, as
they are challenged by the interplay of the patent system and
federal approval from the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”).4 The ever-increasing cost—in both time and money—of
successfully receiving patent protection and FDA approval of a
new drug excessively burdens drug companies and suppresses their
incentive for innovation.5 Although critics have characterized the
patent system as the road to profit and the FDA regulations as a
speed-bump on that road, it is actually the conflict created by the
combination of the two systems—systems that can only be
constructive if they can effectively work in tandem—that hinder
the market-entry process.6 Significantly, the timeline of market
entry renders it impossible for these companies to receive the total
benefit of their patented market-exclusivity because of the
stringent standards that govern the process.7 Pharmaceutical
companies must decide whether to pursue innovation despite the
Tensions Between Food and Drug Law and Patent Law, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 403,
404 (2012).
3
See Matthew Herper, The Cost of Creating a New Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Big
Pharma to Change, FORBES, Aug. 11, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
matthewherper/2013/08/11/how-the-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs-is-shapingthe-future-of-medicine.
4
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 351–52 (2007).
5
See id.
6
See generally Lewin, supra note 2, at 403 (discussing the conflicts created by the
interplay of the FDA approval process and the patent system, and noting their effect on
market entry).
7
See Ronald L. Desrosiers, The Drug Patent Term: Longtime Battleground in the
Control of Health Care Costs, 24 NEW ENG. L. R EV. 115, 120–21 (1989).
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certainty they will not receive maximum rewards, limit their
medical advances to products that they are positive will receive
patentability and likely gain federal approval, or simply leave the
industry and invest elsewhere. Worse, these companies may be
tempted to enter into the newly-regulated compounding
pharmaceutical market, one that is notoriously less stable but may
guarantee a better turnaround for their investments. Consequently,
it is ultimately consumers who suffer, because they are denied
innovative medical discoveries, required to pay larger sums to get
their hands on the available drugs in an increasingly scarce market,
or are forced to obtain drugs from a less reliable industry. Though
patent reform and FDA regulatory review are topics that have been
proposed numerous times, never has a proposal for change been so
urgent as it is now.
Part I of this Note will provide background information on
market entry, discussing both the patent system as well as the FDA
approval requirements. Part I will also analyze the difficulties that
pharmaceutical companies face when attempting market entry of a
new drug because of the intricate challenges inherent in FDA
approval and the patent application process. Further, this Part will
provide a brief background on the current state of the
pharmaceutical industry, which would benefit from more fluidity.
Part II of this Note will address the conflicts engendered by
both the requirements for patentability and the problems with the
effective patent protection afforded once a patent application is
approved. This Part will separately address each of the three
requirements for patentability, and discuss the problems they
create as applied to pharmaceuticals. Last, this Part will discuss
the conflict arising from the length of the patent term as it relates
to the pharmaceutical industry due to the timeline of creating a
successful drug product.
Finally, Part III of this Note will argue that pharmaceutical
protections should be revisited to render them more able to serve
the interests of drug companies and consumers alike. This Part
will also recommend ways to reform the FDA regulatory process
to generate a more efficient system for the pharmaceutical industry
with respect to both market entry and market exclusivity while
preserving the incentive to innovate.
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I. A BACKGROUND ON MARKET ENTRY IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY: THE PATENT PROCESS, REGULATORY DRUG APPROVAL,
AND THE CURRENT STATE OF THE INDUSTRY
Pharmaceuticals in the United States constitute a multi-billion
dollar industry, which provides value to the public through
innovative technologies and essential drugs. In order to appreciate
the discussion of pharmaceutical protection, one must understand
how pharmaceuticals enter the market and the steps each drug must
undergo to achieve market entry. These steps include both the
patent process as well as approval from the FDA. Additionally, in
order to understand the necessity of revisiting the protections
surrounding the pharmaceutical industry—and, specifically, the
incentives in place to fuel pharmaceutical innovation—one must
have a greater understanding of the current state of the industry
and certain prominent trends therein.
A. The Federally Regulated Pharmaceutical Industry
The commercial drug industry enhances the public good by
providing health services.
While the Food and Drug
Administration was created with intent to regulate medicines and
vaccines in the early 1900s, it was not until the 1930s that the FDA
as it is now known took effect.8 In 1938, the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act was created to mandate the safety of
pharmaceuticals and laid out the requirements for pre-marketing
approval and proof of clinical testing with respect to the
pharmaceutical industry.9 Subsequent drug regulations continued
to follow, including laws that separated over-the-counter drugs
from prescription drugs,10 mandated that large-scale manufacturers
abide by registration requirements and stricter safety and efficacy

8
See Hasumati Rahalkar, Historical Overview of Pharmaceutical Industry and Drug
Regulatory Affairs, S11 PHARMACEUTICAL R EG. AFF. 002, 3 (2012), available at
http://www.omicsgroup.org/journals/historical-overview-of-pharmaceutical-industry-anddrug-regulatory-affairs-2167-7689.S11-002.pdf.
9
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399f (2012)).
10
Durham–Humphrey Amendment, Pub. L. No. 82-215, 65 Stat. 648 (1951) (current
version at 21 U.S.C. §353).
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standards,11 and endeavored to incentivize pharmaceutical
innovators by means of patent protections.12 Due to these
regulations, drug companies must make substantial investments to
produce and develop a new drug for market entry, a process that
results in famously high costs to consumers.13 Although the
pharmaceutical industry must necessarily rely on the government
to grant the market approval it needs to make its drugs
commercially available, it has also notoriously relied heavily on
patent protection to ensure a high rate of profit to make up for
development costs.14 For years, patents, which have traditionally
been viewed as a “fundamental incentive to innovative activities in
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology,”15 have acted in tandem with
the federal regulatory approval process to shape the pharmaceutical
industry as it exists today.
1. Market Entry Overview
Pharmaceutical companies that wish to bring a new drug to the
market must engage in a multistep process that includes both
receiving a patent and gaining approval from the FDA. While
patent approval affords protection to pharmaceuticals that are new
and useful—thereby enabling a competitive advantage and market
exclusivity—the FDA grants approval only to those drugs that are
safe and effective.
All processes combined, the market-entry process is
notoriously costly and timely.16 A 2013 Forbes report tracked
11

U.S. Kefauver Harris Amendment, Pub. L. No. 87-781 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (current
version at 21 U.S.C.§§ 301-92).
12
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §271(e) (2012)).
13
See Paul D. Jorgensen, Pharmaceuticals, Political Money, and Public Policy: A
Theoretical and Empirical Agenda, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 561, 563 (2013).
14
See M.J. Murray, The Pharmaceutical Industry: A Study in Corporate Power, 4
INT’ L J. HEALTH S ERVICES 625, 637 (1974).
15
F. Pammoli et al., Global Competitiveness in Pharmaceuticals: A European
Perspective, prepared for the Directorate General Enterprise of the European
Commission, November 2000, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/
healthcare/files/docs/comprep_nov2000_en.pdf.
16
See Vincent J. Roth, Will FDA Data Exclusivity Make Biologic Patents Passé?, 29
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & H IGH TECH. L.J. 249, 251 (2013).
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ninety-eight publicly traded biotechnology and drug companies
over the past decade with data from the Innothink Center for
Research in Biomedical Innovation and found that the average
cost-per-drug for a pharmaceutical company to introduce between
eight and thirteen drugs into the market was $5.3 billion.17 A
different study from researchers at Tufts University revealed that
the average cost-per-drug for new-drug development is roughly
$802 million.18 Though initially challenged, the Tufts study was
later confirmed by further estimates, which revealed even higher
calculated averages for companies introducing one drug into the
market.19
Furthermore, the time spent on patent approval
combined with the time spent conducting clinical trials to satisfy
FDA approval can result in a market-entry process that lasts as
long as fourteen years.20
a) The Patent System: The General Process and the Patent
Term
Patent law has been described as the “classic legal embodiment
of innovation.”21 Few industries, if any, rely as heavily on the
patent system and the protection afforded thereunder as the

17
See Herper, supra note 3 (explaining that the high costs pharmaceutical companies
spend per drug must also account for encountered failures during the R&D process).
18
See DiMasi et al., supra note 1, at 166.
19
See Adams & Brantner, supra note 1, at 420 (estimating an average R&D cost per
drug of $868 million); Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of
Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & D ECISION ECON.
469, 469, 475 (2007) (estimating an R&D cost per drug of $1.24 billion for largemolecule biopharmaceuticals); see also Jim Gilbert et al., Rebuilding Big Pharma’s
Business Model, 21 IN VIVO: BUS. & MED. REP. 10, (2003), available at
http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/cms/Marketing/rebuilding_big_pharma.pdf (adding
that these costs notably include not only successful drug products and clinical trial
outcomes, but also failed drug products and all failed attempts).
20
See Dennis Fernandez, James Huie & Justin Hsu, The Interface of Patents with the
Regulatory Drug Approval Process and How Resulting Interplay Can Affect Market
Entry, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL
INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 969 (A. Krattiger et al. eds., 2007)
[hereinafter Interface of Patents with Regulatory Approval], available at
www.ipHandbook.org (noting that the FDA approval process typically takes between ten
and twelve years, and the patent approval process takes an average of three years).
21
See Lewin, supra note 2, at 412.
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pharmaceutical industry.22 The invention of pharmaceuticals is
driven by the security that patent protection provides in ensuring
that the company is both compensated for its investments in
research and development (“R&D”) and made profitable by its
competitive advantage in the form of exclusivity. This protection
for innovation has significant social value because the security
granted to pharmaceutical companies is meant to fuel innovation
and thereby provides health benefits for the public.
With respect to the pharmaceutical industry, patents provide
legal protection for the new medicines discovered by researchbased pharmaceutical companies. Patents give their owners the
right to use and exclude others from using an invention or
discovery for a limited period of time,23 which in turn enables the
pharmaceutical innovator the ability to recoup her investment.
Pharmaceutical patents are granted to “compositions of matter”
that are “new and useful,”24 and are subject to the conditions that
the invention or discovery is both novel25 and non-obvious.26
Importantly, patent-holders must fully disclose the research and
science underlying their discoveries,27 which makes such
information available to the public at large. The average patent
pendency—the time between when an application is filed and
when the patent is either approved or denied—is about two and a
half years.28
Approved patented products receive market
exclusivity for 20 years from the date that the application of the
patent was filed.29 However, patents are issued very early on in a
product’s development; for pharmaceutical innovations, they are
22

See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 721; Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the
Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 507 (2009); Robert Weissman, A Long,
Strange Trips: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual
Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World
Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1069, 1075–85 (1996).
23
See Patents, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/index.jsp (last visited Apr. 15,
2014).
24
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
25
Id. § 102.
26
Id. § 103.
27
See id.
28
See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP.
FISCAL YEAR 2013 (2013).
29
See 35 U.S.C. § 154.
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issued before the clinical trial testing required for FDA approval
has occurred.30 As a result, the effective market-exclusivity term
for pharmaceutical companies is considered a more limited
monopoly, typically spanning 14 years of its exclusive term,31 and
possibly none of its term at all.32
Pharmaceutical companies invest hundreds of millions—and in
some cases even billions—of dollars into R&D for new drugs,
while generic companies do not need to spend as much for their
market entry because they can rely on the clinical trial results and
satisfied approval requirements submitted by the patented
pharmaceutical company.33 Without patent protection, it is
unlikely that pharmaceutical companies would make the costly
investments necessary to provide this social benefit because they
would never be able to recover these investments.34 It is for this
reason that the patent system is typically acknowledged as a
successful and necessary component of pharmaceutical
development; despite the higher cost to consumers who purchase
patented drugs, the drugs might not exist but for patent
protection.35
i.

Patent Term Extensions Through Regulatory
Exclusivities
There are a number of opportunities afforded to pharmaceutical
patents to supplement the term provided by the Patent Act. These

30

See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 348.
See Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market
Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 MANAGERIAL & D ECISION ECON. 491, 492
(2007) (noting that the “maximum effective patent life” is fourteen years).
32
See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 348 (“Much (or even all) of the term of these initial
patents may have expired by the time the products are brought to market.”).
33
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012) (listing the FDA generic drug application
requirements).
34
See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits
of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1908 (2013) (“Conventional economic actors will only
produce a good when they can appropriate sufficient returns to recoup the capitalized
costs of providing the good.”); see also Roin, supra note 22, at 508 (highlighting the
basic economic concept of corporate hesitation to invest in ideas without a chance of
substantial returns).
35
See Roin, supra note 22, at 508.
31
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extensions have been referred to as regulatory exclusivities36 or
“pseudo-patents.”37 The Orphan Drug Act of 198338 and the
Hatch–Waxman Act of 198439 were the first of these exclusivities
to have an impact on the patent system with respect to
pharmaceuticals. The Orphan Drug Act provides a financial
incentive to pharmaceutical companies that create drugs to treat
rare diseases and conditions40 by providing extended market
exclusivity, among other financial aids like grants and tax
exemptions.41 The Hatch–Waxman Act of 1984 increased the
effective exclusivity period for new brand-name drugs and also
provided drug innovators with market exclusivity for making
changes to a previously approved drug product.42 Thus, this Act
grants drug innovators the ability to temporarily prevent generic
companies from relying on their updated R&D information to
create a generic drug.43 The act also seeks to lower drug prices
through competition, and still enables generic companies to file for
FDA approval by relying on the brand-name drug’s approval
application for a previously approved drug.44 Several years after
the passage of these Acts, The Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) created an additional
36

See John R. Thomas, Into a Silver Age: U.S. Patent Law 1992–2012, 23 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & E NT. L.J. 525, 541 (2013).
37
See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 359.
38
Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. §§
360aa–360ee).
39
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2012)).
40
21 U.S.C. § 360bb (defining “rare” as “any disease or condition which (A) affects
less than 200,000 persons in the United States, or (B) affects more than 200,000 in the
United States and for which there is no reasonable expectation that the cost of developing
and making available in the United States a drug for such disease or condition will be
recovered from sales in the United States of such drug”).
41
Id. § 360cc–ee. Though not stated in the Act, drugs that treat rare diseases are
“commonly referred to as orphan drugs because, prior to the Act, few drug companies
were willing to ‘adopt’ products to treat these diseases.” M. ANGELES VILLARREAL,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20971, ORPHAN DRUG ACT: BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED
LEGISLATION IN THE 107TH CONGRESS (2001).
42
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch–Waxman
Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)).
43
Id.
44
Id.
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incentive in the form of an exclusivity term extension for drugs
with applications to pediatric medicine.45
b) An Overview of the FDA Regulatory Approval Process
and Its Role in the Pharmaceutical Industry
After receiving patent approval but before entering the market,
a pharmaceutical product must receive FDA approval, which
assures that the new product is both safe and effective enough to be
made commercially available.46 While the patent process is
viewed as the key to success for pharmaceutical innovators, the
FDA approval process is traditionally perceived as both an
economic and time-consuming setback.47 With a patent term
already running, drug companies wish to expedite any further
approval requirements as quickly and inexpensively as they can to
gain maximum profitability with their limited market-exclusivity.48
However, pharmaceutical companies can spend up to several
billion dollars per new drug to gain entry into the market.49 About
half of the money that companies spend on R&D is spent
performing clinical trials in order to satisfy the FDA regulations
governing market approval.50 Furthermore, the FDA approval
process can take as long as ten to twelve years.51 Importantly, the
cost to pharmaceutical companies does not stop after approval; the
final phase of safety and quality assessments that occur during the

45

Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.§ 301).
46
21 U.S.C. § 355.
47
See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 349; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting Functional
Balance of Patents and Drug Regulation, 20 HEALTH AFF. 119, 132 (2001).
48
See Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best
Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 70 (Adam B.
Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (noting that a running patent causes drug firms to make every
effort to accelerate progress because their reward is conditional on the success of the drug
as well as the amount of time they are competitively valuable).
49
See Herper, supra note 3.
50
See DiMasi et al., supra note 1 (estimating clinical-period costs of $467 million per
drug).
51
See Interface of Patents with Regulatory Approval, supra note 20, at 966.
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post-marketing period can cost pharmaceutical companies between
twenty and thirty million dollars.52
The requirements that must be met for approval of a newly
patented drug are extensive, and the FDA has the authority to deny
market approval to any drug that does not meet its standards.53
Most importantly, these requirements include investigatory reports
of clinical trials, which demonstrate the drug’s safety and
efficacy.54
They also require chemical-ingredient lists
accompanied by a statement of the drug’s composition; a detailed
report containing how and where the drug was manufactured,
processed and packaged; samples of the drug or its components at
the request of the Secretary; samples of the proposed drug label;
and any supplemental documentation as deemed necessary by the
Secretary or with respect to the drug’s pending approval.55 The
application for FDA approval typically also requires the inclusion
of the respective patent for which drug the applicant seeks
approval.56 Though FDA approval is still required for generic
drugs, the standards that generic drug companies must meet are far
less exacting than those governing new drugs.57
In total, the FDA approval process requires successfully
completing twelve steps from the preclinical through postmarketing periods.58 These steps include animal testing and an
outline for proposed human testing in the preclinical period, three
phases of human testing and studies in the clinical period, meeting
time, application submission, application review, research review,
labeling review, and facility review in the New Drug Application

52

See Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration’s Use of Postmarketing
(Phase IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 295, 370
(2006).
53
21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2012).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Compare id. (approval requirements for newly developed products), with § 355(j)
(approval requirements for generic products).
58
The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm (last visited May
22, 2014).
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review period, and then a final decision from the FDA.59
Furthermore, there is also a fourth phase of safety monitoring and
risk assessment that occurs during the post-marketing period,
because it is presumably impossible to determine all of the effects
of any given drug in the clinical trial phases alone.60
B. Current Industry Trends: Compounding Pharmacies and
Nationwide Drug Shortage
In order to understand why it has become so necessary to
review the protections surrounding the pharmaceutical industry
and move towards reform, it is important to be made aware of the
current state of the entire pharmaceutical industry as well as certain
relevant trends. Both the recent unprecedented federal regulation
of compounding pharmacies, as well as the ongoing nationwide
drug shortage, play a role in ensuring that pharmaceutical
innovation is at its highest and that the incentives provided to
innovators are both reliable and effective.
1. The Non-Federally Regulated Pharmaceutical Market:
Compounded Drugs
In addition to the federally regulated pharmaceutical industry,
there is also another large but traditionally unregulated sector of
pharmaceutical manufacturers in the United States—compounding
pharmacies. According to a Forbes article from September 2013, a
“2012 article in Nature Reviews Drug Discovery says the number
of drugs invented per billion dollars of R&D invested has been cut
in half every nine years for half a century.”61 Furthermore, with
the costs of R&D steadily increasing and the rate of success
steadily declining, small companies stand almost no chance of
competing in the industry, becoming swallowed by the
pharmaceutical giants who have greater resources to invest in a
drug that might potentially succeed.62 This leaves a smaller
company with two basic options: (1) become an exclusively
59
60
61
62

Id.
Id.
See Herper, supra note 3.
See id.
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generic drug company; or (2) adopt drugs that were abandoned by
large companies, forfeiting the opportunity to patent its own drugs
and potentially costing enormous amounts of money to purchase a
patent license.63 However, soon there may be another option
available to such companies, as the traditionally unregulated
compounding pharmacies have recently become targeted by
regulators.
Compounding drug pharmacies began in the 1800s, and used to
be the only source of prescription medication.64 Traditionally,
compounding pharmacies filled special orders placed by doctors
for individual patients.65 The purpose of compounding pharmacies
was to address these individual patient needs on a small scale by
customizing prescription medications in small batches on a caseby-case basis.
Today, there are currently over 50,000
compounding pharmacies in the United States.66
Until very recently, state pharmacy boards—and not the
FDA—oversaw compounding pharmacies. This is unlike the
commercial drug manufacturing process discussed above, whose
products are subject to intensive oversight.67 In 1997, the FDA
crafted the first piece of legislation to address compounding
pharmacies, the FDAMA.68
Under the FDAMA, true
compounding pharmacies were exempt from various FDA
regulations: the Act exempted compounded drugs from FDA
approval and registry and compounding pharmacies from
compliance with any “Good Manufacturing Practices” or safety
63

See id.
See DAVID L. COWEN & WILLIAM H. HELFAND, PHARMACY : AN ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY 100–01 (1990).
65
See Ohio: Ohio Weighs Changes in Execution Methods with Focus on Obtaining
New Sources of Lethal Drugs, U.S. OFFICIAL NEWS, at 2 (Feb. 16, 2013).
66
See Kara Net Hinkley, Compounding Pharmacies: Compounding Interest, 06.2013
NAT’ L C ONF. S T. LEGIS. MAG. 22, 23 (2013).
67
See STAFF OF DEL. EDWARD J. MARKEY, STATE OF DISARRAY: H OW STATES’
INABILITY TO O VERSEE C OMPOUNDING PHARMACIES PUTS P UBLIC H EALTH AT RISK 6
(2013) [hereinafter STATE OF DISARRAY] (a report written by the staff of then
Congressman, now Senator Edward J. Markey (D–MA) using the responses to an
investigation which examined the state oversight of compounding pharmacies).
68
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–115, §
127, 111 Stat. 2296, 2328 (1997).
64
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and efficacy standards.69 The theory behind these seemingly
permissive regulations is that “public health concerns are minor
when mass production is not involved,” and it is not until mass
manufacturing occurs that safety and effectiveness become a
greater risk.70 Compounding pharmacies have the ability to
perform quality control with ease because of the small quantities
produced at a time, so deferring to state authorities for regulation
was deemed reasonable.71
Regulations governing these pharmacies remained untouched
until October 2012, when a contaminated steroid produced by the
New England Compounding Center (NECC) in Massachusetts
killed or injured hundreds.72 The NECC was allegedly one of the
many compounding pharmacies that operated more like a large
drug manufacturer than a small-scale compounding pharmacy.73
The FDA took direct action to find the root of the safety issues
plaguing the NECC by inspecting several compounding
pharmacies, and the results of their inquiry proved disturbing.74
69

See Jessica Dye, U.S. Senate Committee Advances Drug Compounding Bill,
REUTERS (May 22, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/22/us-fda-drugslegislation-idUSBRE94L1AU20130522; see also STATE OF DISARRAY, supra note 67, at
6.
70
See Jesse M. Boodoo, Compounding Problems and Compounding Confusion:
Federal Regulation of Compounded Drug Products and the FDAMA Circuit Split, 36
AM. J.L. & M ED. 220, 232–34 (2010).
71
See id.
72
See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, MULTI-STATE OUTBREAK OF
FUNGAL MENINGITIS AND OTHER INFECTIONS—CASE COUNT (2013), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/hai/outbreaks/meningitis-map-large.html#casecount_table. For more
information on the meningitis outbreak and the continually developing outcomes, see
Scott Gottlieb, Compounding a Crisis at FDA, FORBES, May 24, 2013,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottgottlieb/2013/05/24/compounding-a-crisis-at-fda.
73
See STAFF OF DEL. EDWARD J. M ARKEY, COMPOUNDING PHARMACIES
COMPOUNDING RISK 10 (2012) [hereinafter COMPOUNDING RISK] (a report written by the
staff of then Congressman, now Senator Edward J. Markey (D-MA)).
74
See U.S FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SUMMARY: 2013 FDA PHARMACY INSPECTION
ASSIGNMENT 10 (2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/PharmacyCompounding/ucm347722.htm.
Faulty pharmacy
conditions included “unidentified black particles floating in vials of supposedly sterile
medicine; rust and mold in ‘clean rooms’ where sterile injectable medications were
produced; technicians handling supposedly sterile products with bare hands; and
employees wearing non-sterile lab coats.” Margaret A. Hamburg, Proactive Inspections
Further Highlight Need for New Authorities for Pharmacy Compounding, FDA VOICE
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After attempts to initiate regulatory changes to the
compounding pharmacy market, a final piece of proposed
legislation was signed into law in November of 2013.75 This
regulatory law, entitled the “Drug Quality and Security Act,”76
clarifies current federal law about pharmacy compounding in an
effort to create a uniform, nationwide standard applicable to
compounding pharmacies.77 The Act separates regulation over
traditional small-scale compounding pharmacies from large-scale
compounders that operate more like pharmaceutical manufacturers,
and creates a category for these types of pharmacies called
“outsourcing facilities.”78 It also provides voluntary federal
registration for outsourcing facilities, set to begin in 2015.79 These
facilities will be permitted to compound bulk quantities of drugs on
the FDA’s drug shortage list, in addition to other drugs that are on
a “‘clinical need’ list to be established by the FDA, without a
prescription, as well as distribute these formulations out of state
without limitation.”80 Registered outsourcing facilities will be
subject to FDA oversight similar to the oversight to which regular
commercial pharmaceutical manufacturers in the United States are
subjected.81 The FDA will also have the authority to conduct riskbased inspections.82 Further, certain drugs will be listed as
prohibited from being compounded at these facilities.83

(Apr. 11, 2013), http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2013/04/proactive-inspectionsfurther-highlight-need-for-new-authorities-for-pharmacy-compounding (Dr. Margaret A.
Hamburg is the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration). In her post, Dr.
Hamburg linked to SUMMARY: 2013 FDA PHARMACY INSPECTION ASSIGNMENT, supra
note 74, to reference the inspections conducted.
75
See, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise, Bill on Drug Compounding Clears Congress a Year
After a Meningitis Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2013, at A15.
76
Drug Quality and Security Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-54, 127 Stat. 587 (2013).
77
Id. § 503B.
78
Id.
79
Id. § 744K.
80
See Press Release, Imprimis Pharmaceuticals, Imprimis Optimistic After
Congressional Passage of the Drug Quality and Security Act (Nov. 19, 2013), available
at http://online.wsj.com/article/PR-CO-20131119-905263.html?dsk=y.
81
Drug Quality and Security Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-54, 127 Stat. 587 (2013).
82
Id. § 503B(b)(4).
83
Id. § 503B(a)(5)–(6).
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2. Nationwide Drug Shortage
An ongoing nationwide drug shortage also bears upon the
reform of the pharmaceutical industry as it currently exists. The
nationwide drug shortage in the United States has persisted for
several years; hundreds of drugs appear on a federal notice
shortage list including cancer drugs, anesthetics for surgery, drugs
for emergency medicine, and electrolytes for intravenous
feeding.84
Manufacturing problems, production disruption,
approval oversight, need for recall, increased demand, and a shift
towards compounding pharmacies are all included in the ongoing
list of reasons for the unprecedented shortage.85 More often than
not, manufacturing problems occur as a result of quality-control
problems with the product or the facility in which the product is
created—areas the FDA regulatory approval process is designed to
monitor before market entry occurs.86 Drug shortages are a unique
feature of the pharmaceutical industry because the supply and
demand of necessary drugs operates differently than supply and
demand in other markets given that prices cannot fix the need for
essential medications.87 Also, the shelf life of drugs is an
84

See Katie Thomas, Drug Shortages Persist in U.S., Harming Care, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2012, at A1; Current Drug Shortages Index, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/
Drugs/DrugSafety/DrugShortages/ucm050792.htm (last visited June 6, 2014).
85
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR PREVENTING AND MITIGATING
DRUG SHORTAGES 11 (2013) [hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN FOR DRUG SHORTAGES],
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/DrugShortages/UCM
372566.pdf (explaining that “[o]nce a manufacturer experiences a discontinuance or
interruption in manufacturing, a shortage will occur if there is no other manufacturer to
step in to fill the gap in supply, or if other manufacturers cannot increase production
quickly enough to make up the loss” (citing J. Woodcock and M. Wosinska, Economic
and Technological Drivers of Generic Sterile Injectable Drug Shortages, 93:2 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 170, 174–75 (2013))); see also KEVIN HANINGER,
AMBER JESSUP & KATHLEEN KOEHLER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND
EVALUATION, OFF. OF SCI. & DATA POL’Y, ISSUE BRIEF: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
CAUSES OF DRUG SHORTAGES 1 (2011) [hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS], available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2011/DrugShortages/ib.shtml.
86
See STRATEGIC PLAN FOR DRUG SHORTAGES, supra note 85, at 1 (including issues
“such as roof leakage; mold in manufacturing areas; or unsterilized vials or containers to
hold the product”). Quality issues are those that pose a serious risk to the health and
safety of patients, and often include problems related to contamination or sterility of the
product and facility. Id.
87
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 85, at 1.
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important consideration because of how dangerous the
consumption of expired pharmaceutical products may be.88
Drug shortages directly affect consumers because of the
necessity for access to a particular drug.89 In fact, in direct
response to the pleas from desperate patients in 2011, President
Obama was effectively forced into issuing an executive order
providing that drug makers must notify the FDA when a shortage
appeared imminent.90 Most importantly, however, the drug
shortage has also caused the FDA to loosen its grip on drug
importation procedures as well as on drug approvals for
manufacturers.91 In fact, part of the FDA’s strategic plan to
address these drug shortages is to expedite the review of drug
products that are facing a shortage, and to use its discretion in
enforcing approval of drugs that are considered medically
necessary.92 The impact of a drug shortage on drug companies is
that hasty drug approval, for example, may force a company that is
in the process of developing a new drug product to regress and
redirect its focus on a product that has already entered the market.
The reasons for drug shortages and the additional post-market
approval and review subsequently required may cut into effective
patent terms and add to the costs of R&D. Accordingly, the
frequency of drug shortages may provide insight into a revisiting
of patent protection, specifically with respect to the term.

88

See STRATEGIC PLAN FOR DRUG SHORTAGES, supra note 85, at 4.
See Thomas, supra note 84, at A1.
90
Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, We Can’t Wait: Obama
Administration Takes Action to Reduce Prescription Drug Shortages, Fight Price
Gouging: President Issues Executive Order, Backs Legislation to Require Drug
Companies to Report Shortages (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/10/31/we-can-t-wait-obama-administration-takes-action-reduce-prescriptiondrug.
91
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RES., MANUAL OF
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, MAPP 6003.1: DRUG SHORTAGE MANAGEMENT 4 (2012),
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/Manual
ofPoliciesProcedures/ucm079936.pdf.
92
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR PREVENTING AND MITIGATING
DRUG SHORTAGES 13–14 (2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
DrugSafety/DrugShortages/UCM372566.pdf.
89
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II. THE INHERENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PATENT SYSTEM AND
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
The patent system operates effectively with respect to
industries that would suffer from unfair market disadvantages if
they were barred from developing a superior version of a product
that is not original enough to warrant overarching monopolistic
protection. However, the patent system is often viewed as a poor
fit as it is applied to the pharmaceutical industry.93 Although
inventions in other markets may still be created even if they cannot
receive patent protection, the same does not hold true in the case of
pharmaceuticals. There are few other industries, if any, in which
participants must spend as much money to gain market entry, and
the pharmaceutical industry is burdened by this cost not only
because of the complexities involved in making a drug, but also
because of the regulatory barrier created by the FDA in order to
ensure that drugs on the market are safe and effective.
A. The Difficulty with Applying the Patent Requirements to the
Pharmaceutical Industry
All three patent requirements engender conflict when they are
applied to the pharmaceutical industry. The useful, novel, and
non-obvious94 requirements are seen as a shortcoming in Patent
law with respect to advancing the interests of the pharmaceutical
industry. The utility requirement serves as an inappropriate
standard for pharmaceuticals because of how early in the R&D
process drug patents are filed. Further, the novel and non-obvious
requirements of Patent law “operate to prevent valuable drugs from
being patented before they have been developed for public use.”95
The patent system offers no reward for investing in clinical trials if
one of these standards is not met.96

93

See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 364–65.
35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2012).
95
Roin, supra note 22, at 516 (noting that these requirements fail to ultimately
consider that the significance of a patent stems directly from the social value that the
public receives from a product, not simply from knowledge of the information underlying
that product).
96
See id.
94
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1. The Utility Requirement
The utility requirement of Patent law conflicts with the nature
of pharmaceutical law. The Supreme Court specifically articulated
that the useful requirement of patent law is not a “hunting license,”
meaning that patent law exists to reward the conclusions rather
than the search.97 This requirement is sufficient for most products,
whose creators can easily establish the utility they provide upon
application. In the context of pharmaceuticals, the reasonableness
of this requirement is clear: Patent law seeks to protect valuable
inventions, and a drug only has value so long as it is useful.98
However, the nature of the pharmaceutical industry effectively
requires the utility standard to be lowered because the actual
usefulness of a drug cannot possibly be proved at the onset of
patent application.99 Instead, a drug company must invest
significant amounts of time and money into R&D, as explained
above, in order to meet the FDA clinical requirements that will
eventually determine whether or not the drug is actually useful to
the extent that it was set out to be in its patent.100 Courts have
recognized the cyclical nature of this problem; indeed, a drug
company needs guaranteed intellectual property protection over the
information disclosed in its patent and will not invest time or
money into pharmaceutical innovation without that protection.101
As a result, the USPTO has adjusted the current standard for utility
for pharmaceutical patents to any “reasonable correlation” between
a drug’s pharmacological activities, or how the drug works, and
how or why that product will work in humans as it is asserted in
the patent application.102 The USPTO even instructs patent
examiners that proof of clinical testing in humans for patent
approval is an “unnecessary burden” for pharmaceutical patents.103
This is certainly a departure from the utility standard that almost
97

See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966).
See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 720.
99
See id. (“Patent protection on drugs typically begins and ends too early to permit
firms to capture the full value of subsequently developed information about drug
effects.”).
100
See Herper, supra note 3.
101
See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
102
MPEP § 2107.03 (9th ed. Mar. 2014).
103
Id.
98
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all other kinds of patent applications require, as well as a departure
from the high bar that the Brenner Court established for proof of
utility for a patent.104 It also serves as an acknowledgement that
the utility standard is not appropriate on its face with respect to
pharmaceuticals.105
2. The Novelty Requirement
Oversight of the pharmaceutical industry is also part and parcel
of the novelty requirement. Once a claimed invention has been
made available to the public before its effective filing date, it is
generally considered no longer novel, and therefore not patent
eligible.106 An exception exists for inventors or joint inventors
who have disclosed their invention or idea within one year of the
effective filing date.107 Such publications are not considered prior
art,108 thus encouraging the early application of patentable
creations. The patent system is designed to reward inventions that
the public could not receive if not for the incentives gained from
protection. Of course, there is no reason to protect information
once it is publicly available in order to obtain its value because it is
freely accessible.109 It is for this reason that the novelty
requirement is perceived as a sensible and central bar to patent
approval, no matter the invention seeking protection.110 However,
104

Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966).
See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 724.
106
The novelty doctrine bars the patent approval for any innovation that was patented,
described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the
public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; or “the claimed invention
was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent
published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application,
as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective
filing date of the claimed invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
107
Id.
108
Id. § 102(b). The specific language of this statute includes exceptions for “(1)
disclosures made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of the claimed invention;
and (2) disclosures appearing in applications and patents.” Id.
109
See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933)
(explaining the purpose of rewarding inventors who “give something of value to the
community by adding to the sum of human knowledge”).
110
See Roin, supra note 22, at 519 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6
(1966) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)) (noting the Supreme Court’s reverence of
the novelty requirement as the key to promoting the constitutional purpose for patents).
105
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this broad application of the novelty doctrine overlooks the needed
incentive for protecting the actual pharmaceutical development of
patented invention, a concept that plays a crucial role in this
industry.111
The nature of the pharmaceutical industry—and, in particular,
the FDA approval requirement—conflicts with the novelty
requirement in a unique way. Patents are awarded in return for the
disclosure of an invention but without any regard for the
This concept threatens the
development of that idea.112
pharmaceutical industry in several ways. A considerably small
percentage of proposed drugs ever even make it through all of the
required phases of FDA approval,113 so the public never actually
gains access to the patented drug but, rather, to the drug
information. Furthermore, it is common for scientific journals and
academic publications to disclose drugs in such a way that those
publications therefore stand as a bar to patentability.114 Often,
courts make matters worse by “invaliding drug patents on the basis
of seemingly trivial disclosures often made before anyone
recognized the value of the drug or knew enough about it to file a
patent.”115 However, because the information has been disclosed,
it is no longer considered novel and therefore can no longer be
patented for use in a drug that passes FDA approval in the
future.116 Accordingly, this requirement creates a paradox with
respect to patent protection for pharmaceuticals “wherein a new

111

See Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 924–26
(2011). Note that while this argument utilizes pre-AIA patent law, the analysis regarding
novelty remains the same for the post-AIA patent law with respect to the pharmaceutical
industry.
112
See id. at 924–25.
113
For example, a study conducted from 2004 through 2010 found only 7% of
traditional small molecule chemical drugs that entered human clinical trials obtained
FDA marketing approval. See Bill Berkrot, Success Rates for Experimental Drugs Falls:
Study, REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2011), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/02/14/health-uspharmaceuticals-success-idUKTRE71D2U920110214.
114
See Roin, supra note 22, at 517.
115
Id.
116
See Seymore, supra note 111, at 948–49.
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drug can become unpatentable before it has been tested in clinical
trials.”117
This problem arises frequently because it is quite common for
information in the pharmaceutical industry to be disclosed, either
intentionally or accidentally.118 The patent system, with respect to
such disclosure, places researchers who are simultaneously
working in the same area in a difficult position insofar as the
novelty requirement serves as a barrier to pharmaceutical
patents.119 Patent applications for pharmaceuticals typically
include a broad range of all of the drugs in consideration for
compounding because the application process occurs so early in
R&D.120 It is difficult to know at that time which drugs will
actually be compounded to create the final developed drug product,
so the application becomes a type of catchall to ensure protection
for the patent owner.121 However, some of the disclosed drugs are
eventually discarded, mistakenly or otherwise, and as a result are
not able to be patented for use in subsequent drug development
even if they could prove valuable in the future.122 Thus, innovators
may be forced to give up their patent and consequently forfeit their
117

Roin, supra note 22, at 520. “In the pharmaceutical industry, this rule means that a
drug cannot be patented if the idea for it was previously disclosed to the public; no
exception is made for when the disclosed drug has not yet been tested in clinical trials
and thus has not been approved by the FDA.” Id. at 517. “As a result, the novelty
requirement makes it easy for valuable drugs to become unpatentable before they have
been developed for public use.” Id. While not the main issue of the case, an illustration
of this problem occurred in the facts underlying a case in 2007 when the Federal Circuit
heard an issue relating to a drug that was invented based on the idea of combining two
older drugs to create an even more beneficial effect. See Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v.
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 476 F.3d 1321, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Although the
company was unaware that the other drug information was previously publicly disclosed,
its patent on the combination drug became unenforceable once the previous publication
was realized, despite the fact that the tangible value received by the combination was
unknown to the public before the idea was patented and FDA approved.
118
See Roin, supra note 22, at 522.
119
See Stephen T. Schreiner & Patrick A. Doody, Patent Continuation Applications:
How the PTO’s Proposed New Rules Undermine an Important Part of the U.S. Patent
System with Hundreds of Years of History, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC ’Y 556,
557 (2006).
120
See id.
121
See id.
122
See Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 B ERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1542–
43 (2005).
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research for what could have developed into a vital and valuable
drug product.123 Those abandoned applications that inventors are
forced to give up can then be considered as prior art for future
applications.124 Moreover, it is also possible that lost within this
broad range of information is the disclosure of a new drug that a
researcher does not even realize he has disclosed.125 Further, the
doctrine of inherent anticipation dictates that a drug is not
considered novel if it has been unknowingly disclosed, even if the
researchers do not realize their own discovery.126 Accordingly,
this doctrine interacts with the novelty requirement in a way that
precludes patent approval for drugs that may have provided the
public with a large social benefit but whose value can never be
realized because certain information was disclosed in an
unrecognizable way. While support for this doctrine may be
reasonable for certain inventions,127 it overlooks and suppresses
innovation for others, namely pharmaceuticals. For other products
whose development does not require the same level of complexity
as pharmaceuticals do, knowledge of those inventions may
reasonably preclude patentability because the public can already
benefit from disclosure of that knowledge.128 However, without
the subsequent R&D of drugs, the costs of which drug companies
rely on patent protection to cover, the public will never benefit
from a pharmaceutical simply because its underlying information
was disclosed,129 because the drug will never make its way to
123

See Roin, supra note 22, at 528; see also Moore, supra note 122, at 1542–43.
See MPEP § 901.02 (9th ed. 2014).
125
See Maria Souleau, Legal Aspects of Product Protection—What a Medicinal
Chemist Should Know About Patent Protection, in THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINAL
CHEMISTRY 707, 721 (Camille Georges Wermuth ed., 2d ed. 2003), available at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/book/9780127444819.
126
See Roin, supra note 22, at 526 (“Consequently, whenever a drug is unknowingly
disclosed to the public, it can cease to be novel before anyone knows about it, and the
patent system will no longer reward any efforts to discover it or establish its therapeutic
value.”).
127
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371,
383–84 (2005).
128
See id.
129
See Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH.
L.J. 1, 55, 65–69 (1992) (discussing the disclosure theory and noting how sometimes, the
disclosure of technical information alone may benefit the public).
124
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gaining FDA approval and entry into the market. The complexity
inherent in to the actual invention of a pharmaceutical product
demonstrates that a drug only has value so long as it is developed
and tested by creators who understand those complexities.
Because of the necessity for FDA approval in order to enter the
market, the value of a drug is heavily dependent on product
development and production of information about whether a drug
is safe and effective, and not simply the information alone.130
Lastly, the ability to obtain patents in the pharmaceutical
industry is often undercut by the novelty requirement because of
the nature of the development and research that is required in order
to invent a beneficial drug.
University and private-sector
researchers are often pressured to publish their findings for new
drug discoveries given the nature of their work.131 However, the
weight given to academic publishing makes it difficult to keep
certain elements of research confidential as information may be
published before its value is realized,132 and it is not always clear
which portions of the research must remain secretive in order to
ensure patentability.133 This problem is clearly evidenced by the
large number of universities that were unable to patent their “lifescience” discoveries because of published research.134 Moreover,
the idea that the novelty requirement conflicts in its application to
130

See JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 39–68 (2004) (examining the extensive clinical trial procedures that
are necessary in order to adequately identify drugs that hold significant value).
131
See Joshua A. Newberg & Richard L. Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab:
Law, Values and Rules of Engagement for Industry-University R&D Partnerships, 39
AM. BUS. L.J. 187, 208 (2002) (discussing the pressure academic researchers encounter
to publish their findings early, because of its influence on hiring and job security as well
as preference for research grants, and academic awards).
132
See Nichols Inst. Diagnostics, Inc. v. Scantibodies Clinical Lab., Inc., 195 F. App’x
947, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that a patent on certain antibodies was anticipated by
the inventors’ own abstract, in which they had inadvertently disclosed the patented
antibodies, even though the “significance of the claimed antibody was not known until
after the abstract was submitted”).
133
See Roin, supra note 22, at 527.
134
See Eric G. Campbell & Eran Bendavid, Data-Sharing and Data-Withholding in
Genetics and the Life Sciences: Results of a National Survey of Technology Transfer
Officers, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 241, 252 (2003) (finding that 82% of universities
with large medical-research programs were unable to patent at least one of these
inventions because of research publications).
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the pharmaceutical industry is well supported by the numerous
drugs that have been denied patents for lack of novelty.135
3. Non-Obvious Requirement
The final requirement for patent approval, the non-obviousness
standard, also clashes with pharmaceutical innovation. Described
as the “the most important of the basic patent requirements,”136 this
requirement helps uphold the true purpose of patent law in
“promot[ing] the Progress of . . . useful Arts.”137 The nonobviousness requirement ensures that only the results of true
innovation discovered through risks and effort are rewarded, and
not the “results of ordinary innovation[.]”138 The non-obviousness
requirement precludes patent approval for subject matter that is
obvious, before the effective filing date of the invention, to a
person who has an “ordinary skill in the art” which the invention
pertains to.139 In the context of pharmaceuticals, patents are not
awarded to drug discoveries that are the results of “routine
procedures” that produce expected results,140 where a skilled drug
researcher or chemist would have to do no more than simply verify
135

See, e.g., Ex parte Ames, No. 2007-1138, 2007 WL 1033514, at *3–4 (B.P.A.I. Mar.
28, 2007); Ex parte Sander-Struckmeier, No. 2005-1150, 2005 WL 4773290, at *3–5
(B.P.A.I. Aug. 25, 2005); Ex parte Williams, No. 2005-0902, 2005 WL 4773220, at *4
(B.P.A.I. June 22, 2005); Ex parte Bhagwat, No. 2003-1424, 2004 WL 366282, at *4
(B.P.A.I. Jan. 6, 2004); Ex parte Bennett, No. 2003-1678, 2004 WL 318775, *4–5
(B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 2004); Gilbert v. Levin, No. 2004-1391, 2004 WL 1697793, at *2
(B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 2004); Ex parte Feldmann, No. 2002-0253, 2003 WL 25281968, at *2–4
(B.P.A.I. Mar. 21, 2003); Ex parte D’Antonio, No. 1998-1987, 2001 WL 35825743, at
*6–10 (B.P.A.I. July 24, 2001); Ex parte Hofmann, No. 1996-0729, 1999 WL 33548892,
at *4–5 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 14, 1999) (rejecting the claims on a compound proposed as a
treatment for HIV, but allowing the method-of-use claims to issue); Ex parte Saito, No.
94-4009, 1999 WL 33230062, at *5–6 (B.P.A.I. June 9, 1999); Ex parte Murrer, No. 952603, 1995 WL 1696811, at *5 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 1995); Ex parte Picard, No. 95-2879,
1995 WL 1696846, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 1, 1995).
136
ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 611 (4d ed. 2007).
137
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
138
See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007).
139
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012); see also In re Dow Chemical Co. 837 F.2d 469, 473
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that patents are not awarded where “the prior art would have
suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art that this process should be carried out and
would have a reasonable likelihood of success, viewed in light of the prior art”).
140
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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the successful results of those reasonable expectations.141
However, like the novel requirement, this standard for patent
approval overlooks the unique nature of pharmaceutical
development.
The practical application of this standard is what makes it
inappropriate for pharmaceutical inventions. Alarmingly, in
application, the non-obviousness standard denies patent protection
to an idea or concept for a new drug that is expected to produce
successful results—drugs that are expected to benefit the public
are facially denied patent protection.142 Therefore, the general
rule is that “the more likely it appears that a new drug will be
successful, the less likely it is to be patentable under the nonobviousness requirement.”143 The outcome of this rule as an effect
of the non-obviousness standard creates a paradoxical result for the
pharmaceutical industry, because drugs that seem to hold
significant value early in their development may almost certainly
be denied patent protection.144
Furthermore, the non-obviousness standard denies patent
protection for a potentially obvious idea without considering the
substantial investment necessary to give that idea value. The
public gains no benefit from an idea or concept, no matter how
obvious, until an investment is made into that idea’s
A major criticism of the non-obviousness
development.145
requirement is that it does not take the cost of development into
account146 and, therefore, fails to consider the possibility that
141

See Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
See id. at 1371 (“[A]ny superior property must be unexpected to be considered as
evidence of non-obviousness.” (citing In re Chupp, 816 F.2d 643, 646 (Fed. Cir. 1987))).
For example, when a pain reliever was characterized as having a “substantially greater
analgesic effectiveness than one of the most, if not the most, active analgesic compound
of the art,” its patent application was rejected because these superior drug properties were
deemed predictable based on its chemical structure. In re Carabateas, 345 F.2d 1013,
1017–18 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
143
See Roin, supra note 22, at 537 (citing Ex parte Childers, No. 2003-0890, 2003 WL
25277879, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 22, 2003)).
144
See id.
145
See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE: ANALYZING
THE GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 10 (Princeton Univ. Press 2002).
146
Compare Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1678 (2003) (“If patents are to drive innovation in biotechnology, rather than
142
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although an idea may be obvious, its development into an
invention that reaches the public may never occur “without a
patent to motivate its development.”147 Incorrectly, this standard
assumes that, once the concept for any invention is “accessible to
the public through its obviousness, the invention itself will also be
available.”148 While a non-obvious standard forms a reasonable
barrier to patentability for inventions in other industries that can be
easily developed once underlying information is disclosed or easily
obtained, the cost of R&D provides a disincentive to drug
companies to invest in a new product absent patent protection.149
“The non[-]obviousness standard is therefore based on the dubious
assumption that obvious inventions do not have significant
development costs, or that firms will always be willing to incur
those costs without having patents on the inventions.”150
Perhaps the most alarming conflict of the non-obviousness
standard with the pharmaceutical industry is that it creates a
paradoxical result for the medical community because scientific
advances in pharmaceutical technology serve to exacerbate the
issue of non-obviousness.151 As researchers and scientists work to
make the process of drug discovery and development more
predictable, and subsequently more efficient, the non-obviousness
standard becomes more of a barrier, by denying patent protection
for products that rely on that predictability.152

merely invention . . . courts must take account of the cost and uncertainty of postinvention testing and development.”), with MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 136, at 34
(arguing against awarding patents on the basis of commercialized and developmental
costs).
147
Roin, supra note 22, at 535.
148
Id. at 522 (citing Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7
HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 69 (1992)).
149
See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 350.
150
Roin, supra note 22, at 533.
151
See id. at 542 (“[T]he non[-]obviousness requirement, almost by definition, turns
progress in the pharmaceutical sciences against itself; that is, it denies patent protection to
new drugs based on the very advances in science that led to their discovery.”); id.
(“Through their successes, medicinal chemists are beginning to get better at predicting
the pharmacological properties of compounds based on their structure.”).
152
See id.
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B. Conflict with the Patent Term
An additional conflict that exists between the patent system
and the pharmaceutical industry is the timeline of the patent term.
Pharmaceutical innovators rely on the market exclusivity granted
through patent protection to make returns on their investments in
their products.153 This market exclusivity serves as an incentive to
invest and take risks, as well as security for profitability.154 Unlike
most other products, however, pharmaceuticals require extensive
FDA testing and approval before their product ever gains entry into
the market.155 In recent years, the FDA has implemented even
more requirements and has created higher standards that must be
met.156 As discussed above, these clinical trial periods can last as
long as ten to twelve years, and therefore cut into the twenty-year
exclusivity term in a significant and detrimental way.157 Indeed,
regardless of the amount of time the clinical trials take, the FDA
approval process guarantees the impossibility for a pharmaceutical
company to enjoy the market exclusivity benefits of its full patent
term.158
The largest conflict here, from the position of
pharmaceutical innovators, is that patents should be meaningful for
as long as they are set to be, and “what Congress grants should not
be taken away by regulatory agencies.”159 Furthermore, the
unpredictability of the patent system with respect to its application
153

See Christopher M. Holman, Unpredictability in Patent Law and Its Effect on
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 76 MO. L. REV. 645, 650 (2011).
154
See id. (classifying the process of developing, testing, and marketing a drug as a
“notoriously expensive and high risk gamble”); see also Roin, supra note 22, at 503.
155
See Grabowski & Kyle, supra note 31, at 493.
156
See Bill Berkrot, Success Rates for Experimental Drugs Falls: Study, REUTERS (Feb.
14, 2011), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/02/14/health-us-pharmaceuticals-successidUKTRE71D2U920110214.
157
See Interface of Patents with Regulatory Approval, supra note 20, and
accompanying text.
158
See Desrosiers, supra note 7, at 120–21 (1989) (“Since many FDA pre-market
testing requirements are yet to be performed after the point most patents are obtained, a
manufacturer is unable to market the drug for the full . . . patent term.”).
159
Id. at 124 (citing Patent Term Extension and Pharmaceutical Innovation: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the Comm. on Sci. and Tech.,
97th Cong. 18 (1982)) [hereinafter Patent Hearings] (statement of Robert S. Walker,
U.S. Rep., Pa.) (citing The Half-Life Patents, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1981, http://www.ny
times.com/1981/05/23/opinion/the-half-life-patents.html).
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to pharmaceuticals has also had a deteriorating impact on the
effective market exclusivity term that innovators actually enjoy for
their patented products.160
III. A PROPOSED SHIFT TOWARDS REWARDS-BASED INCENTIVES OR
REGULATORY EXCLUSIVITIES INSTEAD OF PATENT-BASED
PROTECTION FOR THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
In return for the benefits afforded to pharmaceutical companies
under patent protection, the companies provide health benefits to
the public. This relationship serves as a particularly strong
incentive for the provision of adequate protection to
pharmaceutical innovators. Until recently, the patent system was
not perceived as a barrier to innovation.161 Recently, however,
industry critiques of the patent system as it currently exists have
explained how the system is a problem for many companies, in that
it is no longer feasible to predict how long a company’s patent
exclusivity term will actually last.162 Without such predictability,
the patent system becomes useless for pharmaceutical innovators
and investors.
Despite their need to work in tandem, the patent system and the
FDA regulatory approval process have been known to lack the
cooperation necessary to operate effectively with respect to the
pharmaceutical industry; “[p]atent protection is based on an
160

See Holman, supra note 152, at 648 (citing Robert Armitage, A Fresh Start on
Limiting Patent Eligibility: Barring Patents Where Information or the Exercise of Human
Intellect is an Element of a Purported Invention, U. Ill. C. L. (Sept. 22, 2010),
www.law.uiuc.edu/facultyadmin/chakrabarty/videos/armitage.html). Law suits from
either generic drug companies or other innovators challenging patent validity,
inconsistent judicial application of patent law and standards, post-market entry clinical
testing, and product recall are just a few of the many setbacks in pharmaceutical industry
that make the effective patent term unpredictable. Id. at 648–51.
161
Compare WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 316 (2003) (“The strongest case for patents in
something like their present form is said to be found in a subset of the drug industry.”),
with Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 34, at 1951 (“[Proposed incentive] approaches fill in
a gap left by patents’ failure to incent valuable but highly nonexcludable innovations, and
they counter the tendency of patents to exacerbate the problem by drawing resources
away from such innovations.”).
162
See Holman, supra note 153, at 648–51.
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exclusively scientific inquiry that ignores the related issue of FDA
approval necessary for a pharmaceutical manufacturer to fully use
its patent.”163 Additionally, for the pharmaceutical industry, the
current patent system does not achieve its intended goal in
advancing innovation. Rather, the current patent system inhibits
innovation due to its overbroad requirements and a far too limited
term period that do not cooperate with FDA approval, deeming
patent protection meaningless.
“The current unpredictable
environment, wherein the investment backed expectations of
investors are given short shrift, disincentivizes investment and
thereby hampers innovation.”164
For the patent system to work, it must actually enhance
innovation, a goal that is not being met with respect to
pharmaceuticals.165 Economists and scholars have approached the
difficulties presented by the current U.S. patent system in several
different ways, debating whether there are better schemes than
patent protection to incentivize pharmaceutical innovation.166 The
exploration of alternative strategies has increased in recent years,
but no substantial reform has been made with respect to the
pharmaceutical industry and the patent system.167 Alternative
approaches need to be implemented in order to ensure the
continuance of innovative, effective, and beneficial health products
in a federally regulated and safe pharmaceutical market. These
approaches include a proposed rewards-based incentive program
for pharmaceutical innovators and shifting the limited monopoly

163

Sarah Renée Craig, Placebo Patents: Creating Stronger Intellectual Property
Protection for Pharmaceuticals Approved by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration, 19 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 143, 147 (2011) (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 731
F. Supp. 2d 348, 348–50 (D.N.J. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 435 F. App’x 917
(Fed. Cir. 2011)).
164
Holman, supra note 153, at 650–51.
165
See Jorgensen, supra note 13, at 563.
166
See, e.g., Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 48, at 51; Brian D. Wright, The
Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 AM.
ECON. REV. 691 (1983).
167
See Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open
Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1045
(2005).
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ensured by the patent system to a regulatory market-exclusivity
that will become part of the FDA market entry drug process.
Before these proposed alternatives are addressed, it is
necessary to acknowledge how the patent system should be
reformed in a way that better accommodates pharmaceuticals. The
long development cycles, approval cycles, and heavy regulations
on patented pharmaceuticals distinguish them from other types of
products with shorter development cycles or that are subject to less
regulation. In fact, the “one size fits all” approach adopted by
many intellectual property laws, and patent laws in particular, has
been met with strong criticism.168 Integrating Patent law more
harmoniously with the pharmaceutical industry may prove to be an
inconvenient and time-consuming undertaking169 that is not as
efficient as other proposed alternatives. Moreover, reforming
Patent law so that it better serves the pharmaceutical industry may
be unfair to other industries and, more pressingly, violates the
WTO TRIPS agreement that ensures that patent protection is
enforced in a way that is nondiscriminatory with respect to “the
place of invention, the field of technology and whether products
are imported or locally produced.”170 Furthermore, creating a
patent that is specific to the pharmaceutical industry—thereby
rendering such patents similar to design patents—is an undertaking
that would likely take years of reform, thus providing no
immediate benefit to the pharmaceutical industry. This naturally
presents a problem in light of the time-sensitive nature of the need
for, and social benefit provided by, pharmaceuticals. Instead, a
different incentive program or set of FDA regulations would better
resolve the conflicts presented by the patent system as it currently
relates to the pharmaceutical industry.
168

See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 48, at 71 (“Each IP regime should cover
subject matter with similar needs for protection, especially if heterogeneous needs cannot
be remedied by courts. Many controversies arise because of heterogeneity within IP
regimes.”); see also Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 364 (“But the needs of these fields for
patent protection differ greatly, making it difficult to fine-tune the patent laws to meet the
needs of the pharmaceutical industry without upsetting the balance of protection and
competition in other industries.”).
169
See Thomas, supra note 36, at 542.
170
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27, Apr.
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
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A. Rewards-Based Incentives
For over thirty years, it has been recognized that patents are not
necessarily the best incentive for innovation.171 There has been
significant debate over the benefit that the exclusivity incentives of
patents truly provide, suggesting that perhaps rewards-based
incentive programs are better suited for sparking innovation in the
pharmaceutical industry.172
As discussed in Part II, the
requirements of patent protection do not allow for free and full
innovation because such requirements effectively bar the use of
certain drugs due to their patent ineligibility, even including those
that may prove to be the most likely to succeed. Accordingly, it is
important to invest in an incentive program that allows total usage
of all drugs, rewarding those that provide heightened social value
instead of those that are simply novel and non-obvious.
In response to an urge to make use of “technology inducement
prizes”173 as well as Congress’s clear grant of authority to offer
prizes,174 various government agencies have awarded millions of
dollars in prizes to reward and incentivize innovation.175 Rewards
systems pay innovators directly, thus incentivizing innovation
171

See Wright, supra note 166, at 69.
See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 48; Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 34, at
1951; Kapczynski et al., supra note 167, at 1045 (“Economists have long debated
whether direct government funding or prize systems would have better welfare effects
than patents.”); Aidan Hollis, An Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation
4–9 (Jan. 17, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.who.int/
intellectualproperty/news/Submission-Hollis6-Oct.pdf (“Because pharmaceutical markets
function poorly, the patent system does not effectively stimulate drug research and
development. Instead, it induces large amounts of research into drugs with relatively
little incremental therapeutic value, while providing inadequate incentives to innovate in
some areas of great therapeutic value.”).
173
See NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, CONCERNING FEDERALLY SPONSORED INDUCEMENT
PRIZES IN ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE, app. A. at 1–2 (1999) (defining each term).
174
See America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010, H.R. 5116, 111th Cong. (2d
Sess. 2011) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3719 (2012)) (granting agencies the authority to
“carry out a program to award prizes competitively to stimulate innovation that has the
potential to advance the mission of [each] respective agency”). President Obama has also
recently urged agencies to make use of their ability to offer rewards as an incentive for
innovation. See NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL ET AL., A STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION:
SECURING OUR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 12 (2011).
175
See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate,
92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 308 (2013).
172
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without providing a monopolistic advantage.176
Instead of
providing an exclusivity period to make up for the money
expended during R&D and clinical testing, grants awarded to
innovative drugs could support those costs on the front end, while
prizes awarded could reward and supplement that costly
development process post-market entry.177 Furthermore, reward
systems redistribute the source of the money provided to the
innovator from the consumer, who benefits from the product
(through purchase), to the government.178 Under a rewards system,
the government and interested agencies could incentivize
innovation in a number of different ways.179 One reward includes
offering a prize for the first creator of a certain kind of drug.
Another reward is a grant to decrease the costs of R&D for drugs
that target certain illnesses or demonstrate a high likelihood of
success. A third such reward is a tax credit on the costs of R&D.
The timing of a reward system varies and thus differs from the
patent system in a meaningful way. Although the benefit of such
rewards, like patents, are reaped after R&D because they are
granted to innovators who actually prove successful, grants and tax
incentives depart from this condition of Patent law because they
are typically awarded before R&D occurs (and not as a retroactive
reimbursement).180
176

See Steven Shavell et al., Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. &
ECON. 525, 525 (2001).
177
See Jorgensen, supra note 13, at 563 (citing Marc A. Rodwin, Independent Clinical
Trials to Test Drugs: The Neglected Reform, 6 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 113
(2012)).
178
See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 175, at 308. Importantly, some of the funding
for rewards may come from independent agencies or private donors, while in the case of
government grants, for example, this really just means the wealth distribution comes from
taxpayers. See id. at 345.
179
For a detailed discussion and monetary breakdown of an example of what each of
the many suggestions for a rewards-incentive program looks like, see Hemel & Ouellette,
supra note 175, at 311–12. This discussion also reveals a cost-benefit analysis of each of
these rewards, acknowledging what each has that the others may be lacking. See id.
Further, the article suggests how to assess the amount of money for each reward based on
the likelihood of success or demand for the drug. Id. This Note acknowledges the
difficulty involved in assessing a monetary reward amount. See, e.g., Shavell et al., supra
note 176 (although specific considerations that should be taken into account to price each
reward are outside the scope of this Note).
180
See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 175, at 333.
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One concern for a rewards system is the difficulty involved in
calculating the amount of money to be offered in each reward.
Although this challenge is more difficult with prize rewards than
tax credits or grants, the government simply does not have enough
information at the early stage of R&D—that is, when rewards
would be offered—to devise an appropriate reward.181 This
component of a rewards-based system makes patents seem more
favorable, because the benefit of patents directly correlates to the
success of the product once it is on the market.182 Notably,
however, a rewards-based system could simply be made “to value
a project’s inputs rather than its outputs,”183 relying on the profits
the pharmaceutical product brings its creator due to its market
success to reflect the value of the outputs.184
Another concern is that completely replacing the patent system
with a rewards-based system hurts pharmaceutical innovators,
because issuing a set reward and denying all market exclusivity
leaves no room for unexpected additional profits. However, being
the first to create a pharmaceutical product still provides a creator
with a competitive advantage.185 Even if generic companies can
figure out how to copy the pharmaceutical product through reverse
engineering or otherwise, the original creators may still enjoy a
high level of profitability simply because those creators are the
brand-name makers of that product.186 Accordingly, a rewardsbased program can be used to incentivize pharmaceutical
innovation while still preserving the profits generated by being the
first and the best in the market.
181

See Shavell et al., supra note 175, at 526.
See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 48, at 70.
183
See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 175, at 314.
184
In an ideal world, social value could be calculated in a way that the prize could
easily reflect its worth. See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 48, at 70 (“Prizes could
serve the same purposes if the size of the prize could be linked to the social value but
without the deadweight loss of monopoly pricing.”).
185
See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 175, at 310.
186
See Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price
Competition in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J.L. & ECON. 331, 340
(1992) (discussing that findings revealed that, despite the fact that brand-name drug
prices triple generic drug prices, brand-name drugs still retain approximately fifty percent
of their market share two years after generic entry).
182
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B. Regulatory Exclusivities
With respect to the pharmaceutical industry, the patent system
and the FDA regulatory approval process are in disharmony. The
patent process does not sufficiently account for the elements of the
FDA approval process and their impact on the pharmaceutical
industry in a way that makes the effective patent term worthwhile.
Because there are already other regulatory exclusivities,187 it is
conceivable that the FDA can simply extend its control over the
pharmaceutical industry in a way that includes the incentives for
innovation currently received through the intellectual property
component. Furthermore, it is the FDA’s current regulatory
approval process that shortens the patent term and makes the
opportunity for excludability without a patent less likely due to the
substantial information disclosure requirements. Accordingly, it is
within the FDA’s authority to regulate market excludability for
pharmaceuticals due to the inevitable influence of the FDA on the
industry.188
Regulatory exclusivities administered by the FDA can be used
in a way that enhances innovation in the pharmaceutical
industry.189 Like patent protection, regulatory exclusivities can be
designed to grant pharmaceutical innovators periods of exclusivity
in the market, as well as over their information in general. If their
scope is broadened and their effects are heightened, regulatory
exclusivities can serve as the protection and security—analogous
to the patent protection on which the pharmaceutical industry
currently relies—to ensure returned investments and offer promise
for sufficient profitability.
The pharmaceutical industry already enjoys certain kinds of
regulatory exclusivities administered by the FDA.190 For example,

187

See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 360–61 (discussing the role that the FDA already
plays in issuing patent extensions by the use of its regulatory authority, and terming these
regulatory exclusivities “pseudo patents”).
188
The pharmaceutical industry has long argued that the period of time spent
performing clinical testing for FDA approval should be returned to them in the form of
additional market exclusivity. See Patent Hearings, supra note 159.
189
See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 348.
190
See supra Part I.A.1.
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the FDCA grants drug innovators five years of data exclusivity.191
Data exclusivities prevent generic drug companies from relying on
the clinical trial data and drug information produced by the original
drug maker to obtain FDA approval once the original patent has
expired. The FDA also administers market exclusivities, which
bear an even stronger relation to the limited monopoly granted by
patent protection.192 Regulatory market exclusivities like these
appear in the Orphan Drug Act193 and the pediatric provision in the
FDAMA.194
Naturally, market exclusivities grant stronger
protection for the innovator because they bar other companies from
entering into the market at all, whereas data exclusivity still
enables market entry to drug companies who invest in their own
clinical trials and drug testing.195
Regulatory market exclusivities are a better approach than
patent protections, because they fill the gaps left by patent law and
allow for necessary “fine tuning” to the pharmaceutical industry
without disrupting other patentable markets.196 Importantly,
regulatory market exclusivities include protection for the products
that are left behind and rendered unpatentable due to the problems
that lie within the useful, novel, and non-obviousness requirements
addressed in Part III. As noted, the patent requirements are not
appropriate when applied to the pharmaceutical industry because
they do not account for the social value that is provided by a drug
deemed unpatentable by these strict standards. Consequently, they
force pharmaceutical innovators to tip-toe around the rigidity of
patentability standards, often foregoing what would be the more
socially beneficial approach to safeguard the possibility that their
innovations will receive the protection they need to be worth the
191

See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012). However, the actual effective period of market
exclusivity afforded by this data exclusivity regulation is not generally viewed as long
enough to sufficiently incentivize innovation and investment into drug development. See
Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance Between
Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 479, 487 (2008).
192
See Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 123
193
See Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. §
360aa–ee).
194
See Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 127, 111 Stat. 2296, 2328 (1997).
195
See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 348.
196
See id. at 364.
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investment. In practice, innovators often must avoid using any
drugs that might be deemed unpatentable,197 even if the possibility
exists that the avoided drug is the best-known option.
Furthermore, patentability standards also discourage innovators
from disclosing experimental failures for fear that such disclosure
might damage their chances of patenting certain drugs in the future
due to lack of novelty. This is problematic because such drug
information is helpful in promoting efficiency198 and fostering
innovation.199 In addressing this concern, FDA regulatory market
exclusivities could replace patent protection in a way that would
close this gap. Instead of affording protection to products for
meeting standards that ignore the reason pharmaceutical
innovation is so important to this country, regulatory exclusivities
are designed to protect products that are socially valuable.200
Regulatory market exclusivities are also more appropriate in
light of the pharmaceutical development process.201 Because the
time and cost of the stringent FDA standards for approval for
market entry often cut into the effective patent term,202 it seems
197

See Roin, supra note 22, at 503 (“The novelty and non[-]obviousness requirements
make no concession for the development costs of inventions and thus cause patents to be
withheld from drugs that are unlikely to reach the public without that protection.”).
198
See Seymore, supra note 111, at 955–56 (“At minimum, the disclosure saves time
and money by preventing the repetition of dead-end experiments.”).
199
See id. (“There is indeed hope that reading the details of the failed experiment will
induce innovative thinking to solve that specific problem or others.”).
200
See Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049; Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
1585; Pediatric Exclusivity Incentive in the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997, PL 105–115, Nov. 21, 1997, 111 Stat 2296, §505(A), for
marked examples of regulatory exclusivity extensions for drugs that are valuable or
needed; see also STRATEGIC PLAN FOR DRUG SHORTAGES, supra note 85 (strategic Plan to
expedite approval of drugs on drug shortage list); America COMPETES Reauthorization
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-358, §105, 124 Stat. 3982, 3989-93 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
3719) (granting agencies the authority to “carry out a program to award prizes
competitively to stimulate innovation that has the potential to advance the mission of
[each] respective agency”); see also supra note 174 (providing examples of regulatory
incentives awarded to drugs that are valuable or needed).
201
See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 351–53.
202
Although the Hatch–Waxman Act seeks to address this conflict by giving
pharmaceutical patents term extensions for up to five years due to delays in the regulatory
approval process, the approval process often compromises much longer than five years of
the patent term, and regulatory approval delays are not the only factors that cut into the
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more sensible for the FDA to administer the term for market
exclusivity. The interplay between the length of the FDA approval
process and the patent term creates a paradoxical situation for
pharmaceutical innovators who are forced to choose between a
drug that may have a greater benefit to the public but guarantee a
longer clinical testing period, and drugs that are more likely to
have a shorter clinical trial period but may not be as socially
valuable.203 In response, regulatory exclusivities are more suitable
than patents because regulatory exclusivity periods “typically do
not begin until a product is on the market,”204 in contrast with a
patent term that begins at the time the patent application is filed.205
Furthermore, the period of market exclusivity provided to drug
companies is uniform under a regulatory regime, rewarding
pharmaceutical innovators in the same way for investing in
effective health products that serve to benefit the public.206
An example of this type of regulatory market exclusivity
appears in the Modernizing Our Drug & Diagnostics Evaluation
and Regulatory Network Cures Act of 2013 (“MODDERN Cures
Act of 2013”),207 which was introduced on September 17, 2013,
and promotes using regulatory exclusivities over patent law. The
bill specifically acknowledged findings that the lack of
development of potentially valuable drugs is due to
“insufficiencies” in the patent-protection system and, therefore,
seeks to remedy that problem by supplementing—and perhaps
patent term. See Interface of Patents with Regulatory Approval, supra note 20; see also
Andrew A. Caffrey, III & Jonathan M. Rotter, Consumer Protection, Patents and
Procedure: Generic Drug Market Entry and the Need to Reform the Hatch-Waxman Act,
9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 26–76 (2004).
203
See Maxwell R. Morgan, Regulation of Innovation Under Follow-on Biologics
Legislation: FDA Exclusivity As an Efficient Incentive Mechanism, 11 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 93, 106 (2010); see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 161, at 300
(discussing that, despite the correlation between the costs of R&D and the degree of
patent protection needed to adequately incentivize development, the patent system does
not tailor patent protection to the costs of R&D).
204
Thomas, supra note 36, at 542.
205
35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
206
See Morgan, supra note 203, at 105–06 (suggesting a uniform approach, and noting
that most ideally, exclusivity time periods would be tailored to the time and costs of
clinical research and development).
207
H.R. 3116, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
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replacing—patent protection with regulatory exclusivities.208 For
example, one component of the proposed legislation includes
extending the exclusivity period for drugs that address unmet
medical needs (“dormant therapies”), giving such drugs an
additional fifteen years of data exclusivity.209 Furthermore, the bill
provides the opportunity to extend the patents on approved drugs
that qualify as dormant therapies.210 The MODDERN Cures Act
of 2013 also provides for an extension of the exclusivity of drugs
that demonstrate—through diagnostic testing—applicability to a
certain patient population.211 Lastly, the bill directs the Secretary
to engage with appropriate authorities in an analysis of current
intellectual property protection laws governing pharmaceuticals to
determine the best way to shape those laws to enhance necessary
development.212 Importantly, the bill is broader than the kinds of
regulatory exclusivities that would be needed to completely
overcome patent law, the details of which are outside the scope of
this Note. Furthermore, it is also in an early stage and may stand
to face a great deal of opposition. Nonetheless, the MODDERN
Cures Act of 2013 represents a significant shift in the area of
pharmaceutical protection and innovation, and remains a relevant
example of the direction the pharmaceutical industry may take
over years to come.
CONCLUSION
A review and reform of the way that the pharmaceutical
industry is protected and pharmaceutical innovation is incentivized
is long overdue. Innovation in this industry is essential, and it is
necessary that the incentives designed to fuel innovation take into
account the way the industry functions. In this regard, the patent
system fails to serve its intended purpose. Any reforms that are
implemented should account for the cost and time inherent in the
R&D process as well as the social value of pharmaceutical
208
209
210
211
212

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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innovation to the public. Ultimately, such reforms would enable
the development of desirable and effective pharmaceutical
products while providing room for creative and inventive research
that is not restricted or restrained by the stringent standards of the
patent system.

